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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction in accordance with
§ 78~2-2-(3) (j) Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1991)1 because this is
an appeal from a final order of the District Court for the First
Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and for the County of
Cache and jurisdiction has not been placed in the Court of Appeals
under § 78-2a-3 U.C.A.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether a freely bargained for contractual provision

which determines where venue shall lie for causes of action arising
out of that contract is enforceable?

2.

Whether a parties' stipulation, that all litigation

arising out their mutual contract shall be brought in a court of
competent jurisdiction where the defendant

resides, requires

dismissal of an action brought otherwise than in accordance with
its terms?

3.

Whether a forum selection clause providing that venue for

any litigation arising out of the Agreement, or in connection with
the transaction shall lie in a particular court is mandatory?

'Unless otherwise stated, all further references to Utah Code
Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1991) shall be referred to as U.C.A.

4.

Whether

the

attempted

unilateral

termination

of

an

Agreement containing a valid forum selection clause by the party
seeking to avoid enforcement of the Agreement's

forum

selection

clause prevents enforcement of the forum selection clause?

All issues involve questions of law, therefore the District
Court's rulings should be reviewed for their correctness.

Mountain

Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake Citv. 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Ut. 1988).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The

following Utah State Statutes and

section

of the Utah

Constitution are applicable to the case at bar:
§ 78-13-9, Utah Code Annotated

(1953):

The court may, on motion, change the place of trial
in the following cases:
(1) when the county designated in the complaint is
not the proper county.
(2)
when there is reason to believe that an
impartial trial cannot be had in the county, city, or
precinct designated in the complaint.
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends
of justice would be promoted by the change.
(4) when all the parties to an action,
by
stipulation or by consent in open court entered in the
minutes, agree that the place of trial may be changed to
another county.
Thereupon the court must order the
change as agreed upon.
§ 78-13-4 Utah Code Annotated

(1953):

When the defendant has contracted in writing to
perform an obligation in a particular county of the state
and resides in another county, an action on such contract
obligation may be commenced and tried in the county where

2

such obligation is to be performed
defendant resides.

or in which the

§ 78-13-4, Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1991), as amended:
When the defendant has signed a contract in the
state to perform an obligation, an action on the contract
may be commenced and tried in the following venues:
(1) If the action is to enforce an interest in real
property securing a consumer's obligation, the action may
be brought only in the county where the real property is
located or where the defendant resides.
(2) An action to enforce an interest other than
under Subsection (1) may be brought in the county where
such obligation is to be performed, the contract was
signed, or in which the defendant resides.
§ 78-13-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953):
In all other cases the action must be tried in the
county in which the cause of action arises, or in the
county in which any defendant resides at the commencement
of the action; provided, that if any such defendant is a
corporation, any county in which such corporation has its
principal office or place of business shall be deemed the
county in which such corporation resides within the
meaning of this section.
If none of the defendants
resides in this state, such action may be commenced and
tried in any county which the plaintiff may designate in
his complaint; and if the defendant is about to depart
from the state, such action may be tried in any county
where any of the parties resides or service is had,
subject, however, to the power of the court to change the
place of trial as provided by law.
Article VIII, Section

5, Constitution

of Utah, prior to 1985

repeal:
The state shall be divided into seven judicial
districts, for each of which, at least one judge shall be
selected as hereinbefore provided.
Until otherwise
provided by law, a district court at the county seat of
each county shall be held at least four times a year.
All civil and criminal business arising in any county,
must be tried in such county, unless a change of venue be
taJc^n, in such cases as may be provided by law. Each
judge of a district court shall be at least twenty-five
years of age, an active member of the bar in good
standing, learned in the law, a resident of the state of

3

Utah three years next preceding his selection, and shall
reside in the district for which he shall be selected.
Any district judge may hold a district court in any
county at the request of the judge of the district, and,
upon a request of the governor it shall be his duty to do
so. Any cause in the district court may be tried by a
judge pro tempore, who must be a member of the bar, sworn
to try the cause, and agreed upon by the parties, or
their attorneys of record. (As amended November 7, 1944,
effective January 1, 1945.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
The present appeal concerns the enforcement of a contractual
stipulation specifying the forum for litigation arising out of the
contracting parties' relationship.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The plaintiff originally filed its complaint for breach of
contract in the District Court of the First Judicial District of
the State of Utah ("District Court").

The defendant then brought

a Motion to Dismiss, based upon a clause in the contract which
required that all actions be brought
jurisdiction

in the

state where

in a court of competent

the defendant

resides.

The

District Court determined that enforcement of the forum selection
clause

contained

in

the

contract

was

not

prohibited

by

any

applicable Utah law and that the contractual stipulation should be
enforced according to its express terms. Accordingly, the District
Court dismissed the case.

The plaintiff has appealed the District

Court's dismissal of the case to this court.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Lundahl

Instruments,

Appellant

(a Utah

("STI"),

Defendant

voluntarily,

Inc.

corporation),
and

knowingly,

and

Appellee
at

("Lundahl"),

(a

arm's

Safety

Technology,

California
length

Plaintiff

and
Inc.

corporation),

and

under

the

representation of counsel executed a Master License and Marketing
Agreement dated April 21, 1989 ("Agreement"). (Record at 53.)
2.

STI's

California.
3.

principal

place

of business

and

residence

is

(Record at 1, 23).

The Agreement contains a clause which says, in pertinent

part:
Venue for any litigation arising out of this
Agreement, or in connection with the transactions
contemplated hereby, shall lie in any federal or state
court sitting in Defendant's state, with proper
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. Therefor,
if Lundahl were to commence an action against STI,
jurisdiction would be in California; if STI were to file
an action against Lundahl, jurisdiction would be in Utah.
(Record at 54.)
4.
terminate

In February of 1991, Lundahl unilaterally attempted to
the Agreement,

over the written

objections

of STI.

(Record at 40).
5.
the

STI does not recognize Lundahl's improper termination of

Agreement

and

intends

to

assert

numerous

defenses

counterclaims based upon Lundahl's wrongful actions.

and

(Record at

40-41) .
6.

Lundahl filed the instant action on June 6, 1991; and the

District Court dismissed the action on September 30, 1991, based

5

upon § 78-13-4 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended.

(Record at 1,

53-55).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah law provides that its venue provisions may be waived by
parties

to

an

action.

Further,

Utah

law

allows

parties

to

stipulate where venue for certain types of action will lie.
In the present case, each party to the contract knowingly
waived its right to assert venue according to the statutes of the
state where it maintains its respective residence.

The parties

stipulated that venue for any litigation arising out of their
Agreement, or in any way connected with the Agreement, should lie
in any federal or state court sitting in the defendant's state,
provided the court has proper jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Because Utah law allows venue to be waived, and by statute
expressly provides that parties may stipulate where venue shall
lie, the parties should be bound by the terms of their contract,
which contract was freely bargained for and entered into with the
able representation of counsel, and for which no allegations of
fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching, undue bargaining power or
adhesion have been raised.
The unambiguous wording of the forum selection clause and use
of the word "shall" are mandatory rather than permissive.
should be enforced accordingly.

6

It

Further, the equities of the case being evenly balanced,
plaintiff should be required to bear the hardship of traveling to
a foreign forum because it agreed to at the time of contracting.
Finally, because no fraud in connection with the forum
selection clause as been alleged, and because this action arises
out of the Agreement or in connection with the transactions
contemplated therein, a wrongful, unilateral attempt to terminate
the Agreement, even if successful, does not affect the validity and
enforceability of the forum selection clause.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE IS VALID,
AUTHORIZED BY UTAH STATUTES AND CASE LAW.

ENFORCEABLE, AND

A.

Facie Valid And

Forum Selection Clauses Are Prima
Enforceable Under The Majority Rule.

Even though forum selection clauses in the past were not well
received, "the vast majority of courts today follow the rule that
such clauses are prima facie valid and will be upheld absent a
showing that they result from fraud, overreaching, that they are
unreasonable or unfair, or that enforcement would contravene a
strong public policy of the forum." Intermountain Systems, Inc. v.
Edsall Const. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D. Colo. 1983);
Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute. 499 U.S.
(1991).

, 113 L. Ed. 622

The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80 (1971)

follows this same approach and it has been adopted by many state
courts. See, Manrique /. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. n 986);
ABC Mobile Systems, Inc. v. Harvev, 701 P.2d 137, 139 (Colo. App.
7

1985);

Colonial Leasing Co, v. Mcllrov, 765 P.2d 219, 220 (Or.

App. 1988) .
Prior hostility of courts to forum selection clauses was due
to an argument that such clauses tended to "oust" a court of
jurisdiction.

This was squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in

The Bremen v> Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1971).

In

Bremen, the Court rejected such arguments as "hardly more than a
vestigial

legal

fiction."

Id.

Regarding

the

ouster

of

jurisdiction argument, the Court stated:
"It appears to rest at core on historical judicial
resistance to any attempt to reduce the power and
business of a particular court and has little place
in an era when all courts are overloaded and when
businesses once essentially local now operate in
world markets.
It reflects something of a
provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other
tribunals."
Id.

The threshold

question which should be applied today is

whether a court should exercise "its jurisdiction to do more than
give

effect

to

the

legitimate

expectations

of

the

parties,

manifested in their freely negotiated agreement, by specifically
enforcing the forum clause."

Id.

Courts have given various reasons supporting the enforcement
of forum selection clauses:

(1)

Such clauses are demanded by

present-day commercial realities and expanding trade.
(2)

Failure to enforce such clauses will provide

Id. at 15.
"procedural

loopholes through which one of the contracting parties can use
dilatory

tactics to escape clearly

entered

into obligations."

Maritime LTD. Partnership v. Greenman AD. A. , 455 So. 2d 1121, 1123
(Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1984).

(3)
8

They promote uniform results

because a corporate defendant will not have to litigate similar
issues in numerous different forums. LFC Lessors, Inc. v. Pearson,
585 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (D. Mass. 1984).
legitimate expectation of the parties;
v. RICOH Corp. .

487 U.S. 22, 33

Justice Kennedy) .

(5)

(4) They protect the

Steward Organization, Inc.

(1988)

(Concurring opinion by

They limit the fora in which a large

corporate defendant could be potentially subject to suit. Carnival
Cruise Lines v. Shute. 113 L. Ed. at 632.

(6)

They dispel

confusion "about where suits arising from the contract must be
brought and defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of
pretrial motions to determine the correct forum, and conserving
judicial resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding
those motions."

Id.

(7)

Finally, they reduce litigation costs,

which savings may be passed on to consumers.

Id.

Utah courts have not expressly adopted the Restatement or
federal case law, nor have they addressed whether forum selection
clauses are even valid and enforceable.

Utah case law and Utah

statutes are, however, in harmony with the above principles.
B.

Forum Selection Clauses Do Not Contravene Any Strong
Public Policies of the State of Utah.

Sections 78-13-9(3) and 78-13-9(4) U.C.A. state:
The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the
following cases:
(3) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of
justice would be promoted by the change.
(4) when all parties to an action, by stipulation or by
consent in open court entered in the minutes, agree that
the place of trial may be changed to another county.
Thereupon the court must order the change as agreed upon.
9

Montana has almost identical statutory provisions except for
one very significant difference.

The Montana statutes state:

Section 25-2-201 Montana Code Ann- (1991), When change of
venue is required. The court or judge must, on motion, change
the place of trial in the following cases: . . . (3) when the
convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be
promoted by the change.
Section 25-2-202 Montana Code Ann. (1991) , Change of venue on
agreement of parties.
All the parties to an action, by
stipulation or by consent in open court entered in the
minutes, may agree that the place of trial may be changed to
any county in the state. Thereupon the court must order the
change as agreed upon. (Emphasis added)
The

Montana

supreme

court

has

held

that

these

statutes

authorize forum selection clauses in contracts. Montana Wholesale
Accounts Service. 758 P.2d 759, 760 (Mont. 1988).
Section 78-13-9(4) U.C.A. does not restrict changes in venue
to counties within the state, as does Montana's statute.

If the

Utah legislature had intended that changes in venue be limited to
changes within the state it would have drafted the statute as did
the Montana legislature.

The fact that the words "in the state"

are missing in the Utah statute indicates the legislature did not
intend a similar restriction.

Even if the omission was merely an

oversight on the part of the legislature, the broad authority
contained in

§ 78-13-9(3) U.C.A. indicates that such contractual

provisions are not against any strong public policy enunciated by
the legislature.
A legislature knows how to draft a statute to clearly state
their

intent.

In

Title

29,

General

10

Provisions

Relating

to

Contracts, Idaho Code Ann. (1991 Supp.) § 29-110, Limitations on
right to sue, it states:
Every stipulation or condition in a contract, by which any
party thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under
the contract by the usual proceedings in the ordinary
tribunal, or which limits the time within which he may thus
enforce his rights, is void.
Id.
The

Utah

provision.

statutes

are

devoid

of

any

remotely

similar

Therefore, enforcement of a forum selection clause in

Utah would not contravene any strong public policy.
Regardless of which venue statute is controlling, the results
are identical. Section 78-13-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953), § 78-13-4
U.C.A., and § 78-13-7 U.C.A. all allow venue for the present case
to lie in the county where the defendant resides and are modified
and controlled by the additional options of § 78-13-9 U.C.A.

A

complete reading of § 78-13-7 U.C.A. reveals that, contrary to
plaintiff's contention, there is nothing requiring the current
action to be brought exclusively in the First Judicial District
Court of the State of Utah or even requiring it to be in Utah as it
states the action may be "in the county in which any defendant
resides" or "[i]f none of the defendants resides in this state,
such action may be commenced and tried in any county which the
plaintiff may designate in this complaint." Id. , (emphasis added).
The use of the word "may" makes this provision purely permissive.
Defendant does not dispute that absent the contractual
stipulation f\\e

current action could be brought in the First

Judicial District; however, by its express terms § 78-13-7 U.C.A.
11

does not mandate that the current action be maintained only in the
First Judicial District.

Moreover, § 78-13-7 U.C.A.

is still

"subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as
provided by law" and thus any mandatory directives of § 78-13-7
U.C.A. are subject to the overriding provisions of § 78-13-9 U.C.A.
Article VIII, Section 5, Constitution of Utah, which was repealed
in 1985, is irrelevant to the current action because in White v.
Rio Grande Western Railroad Co.. 71 P. 593, 594 (Ut. 1903) the
court stated that this section is "so indefinite and general as to
render it necessary in each case in which the venue is made an
issue to resort to the common law in order to determine whether the
venue has been properly laid."

Id.

Current statutes have made a

resort to the common law unnecessary to determine where venue
should properly lie.
Finally,

§

78-13-9(4)

U.C.A.

does

not

state

that

only

stipulations entered into by the parties to the action subsequent
to filing a court action are enforceable by the court.
section

states

that

when

parties

to

an

action,

This

either

by

stipulation or by consent in open court agree that the place of
trial may be changed to another county, "[t]he court must order the
change as agreed upon."
court,

as previously

(emphasis added).

quoted,

has

The Montana supreme

interpreted

this to

include

contractual agreements entered into by the parties prior to any
litigation. Montana Wholesale Accounts. 758 P.2d at 760. Notably,
§ 78-13-9(4) U.C.A. is not permissive; it requires courts to order
changes according to the parties' agreement.
12

C.

Forum Selection Clauses Should Be Enforced Because They
Represent Parties' Rights To Freely Contract As Desired,
Absent Any Violation Of Public Policy Considerations,

Utah courts have long recognized that "[w]ith few exceptions,
it is axiomatic in contract law that persons dealing at arm's
length are entitled to contract on their own terms without the
intervention of the courts for the purpose of relieving one side or
the other from the effects of a bad bargain."
v.

Huth.

664

P.2d

455, 459

(Ut. 1983);

Bekins Bar V Ranch

see

also

John

Call

Engineering v. Manti City Corp. , 743 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Ut. 1987) ("a
party is bound by the contract which he or she voluntarily and
knowingly signs,"); Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 926,
928 (Ut. 1980) ("it is not unreasonable to hold a party responsible
for obligations he assumes by contract.").
Under the above enunciated principles, Utah recognizes that
parties should be bound by the contracts which are freely entered
into and they should not be allowed to escape responsibility for
terms which they agreed to, just because the deal may have turned
sour.

Although Utah

courts have not applied

these

contract

principles to cases dealing with forum selection clauses, federal
courts have and they have required parties to abide by the terms of
their agreements. In Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci American, Inc. ,
858 F.2d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1988) the plaintiff, an exclusive
dealer of Italian perfume, brought an action against the perfume's
manufacturer for breach of contract and various torts. The Italian
defendant sought to enforce a forum selection clause that required
actions to be brought in Italian courts.
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In rejecting the concern

propounded by the plaintiff the court stated, "it is a concern
which the parties presumably thought about and resolved when they
included

the

forum

selection

clause

in

their

plaintiff] now wants to change the bargain."
Similarly,

in

Rini

Wine

Co.

v.

contract.

[The

Wineries

and

Id.
Guild

Distilleries. 604 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1985) the court found
that the inconveniences asserted by the party seeking to avoid the
forum selection clause were not grounds sufficient
transfer of the case.

to prevent

Much like the Manetti-Farrow court, the

court in Rini Wine Co. stated that because the plaintiff could have
foreseen the inconveniences

at the time of entering

agreement, it could not now complain of any injustice.

into the
Id. at

1059.
D.

Forum Section Clauses Should Be Valid And Enforceable
Because Contracting Parties Have Waived Their Rights To
Venue As Dictated by Statute.

Finally, under Utah law "venue is a privilege which may be
waived."

Petersen v. Oaden Union Railway and Depot Co., 175 P.2d

744, 747 (Ut. 1946).

"Provisions in a contract selecting a forum

act as a waiver of statutory provisions which would
determine the appropriate forum."

normally

Furry v. First Nat. Monetary

Corp., 602 F. Supp. 6, 8 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
A forum selection clause acts as a waiver of venue rights and
the right to assert lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense.
International Investment and Equine Consultants. Inc., 573 F. Supp.
592, 594 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Vessels Oil & Gas Co. v. Coastal Refining
and Marketing. Inc. f 764 P.2d 391, 392 (Colo. App. 1988).
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Because

parties to a contract may "agree in advance to submit to the
jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the
opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether," it follows
that parties may also agree concerning where venue shall lie. The
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11.
Lundahl voluntarily waived its rights to the venue provisions
in Utah's statutes when it agreed that:
Venue for any litigation arising out of this Agreement, or in
connection with the transactions contemplated hereby, shall
lie in any federal or state court sitting in Defendant's
state, with proper jurisdiction over the subject-matter
thereof. Therefore, if Lundahl were to commence an action
against STI, jurisdiction would be in California; if STI were
to file an action against Lundahl, jurisdiction would be in
Utah.
Lundahl foresaw the inconveniences that might arise from such a
provision; however, while represented by counsel, it freely chose
to enter into the Agreement.
fraud,

misrepresentation,

unfairness.

There have been no allegations of
overreaching,

unreasonableness

or

Regardless of whether the case is litigated in

California or Utah, one party will suffer an inconvenience. Each
party was equally bound by the Agreement's terms. Had STI brought
the action it would have been required to endure the inconveniences
of litigating in a foreign forum.
The action is for breach of contract and subject-matter
jurisdiction is proper within a California court. There have been
no allegations that California does not have an interest in
guarantying a party's rights under a contract. Hence Lundahl would
not be deprived of its day in court, nor will it work an injustice
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to require Lundahl to litigate its claims in a California's court.
Accordingly, the plain terms of the Agreement should be enforced.
II.

THE CONTRACTUAL STIPULATION IS MANDATORY, UNLESS WAIVED.
"'Shall'

in

other

contexts

has

an

ordinary

meaning

of

imperative obligation, leaving no discretion or choice for the
actor.

It is typically contrasted and distinguished from 'may.'"

Intermountain Systems Inc., 575 F. Supp. at 1198.

The judge in

Intermountain further stated, "I know of no reason why a different
result should obtain in a forum selection clause."

Id.; see e.g.,

S. Lewis Lionberaer Co. v. Edward G. Gerritts. 687 F. Supp. 237,
238 (W.D. Va. 1987) (clause which simply submitted any and all
disputes to a particular forum was found to be mandatory.)2; see
also, ABC Mobile Systems, 701 P.2d at 139 (forum selection clause
merely stating "the venue of actions . . . are placed"3 found to
be mandatory.)
The contractual stipulation in question contains much stronger
language than the provisions referenced above.

It is not merely

permissive because it states venue "shall" lie in the defendant's
resident state.

Moreover, to clarify, the stipulation gives an

illustration of how venue shall be determined.

In view of the

2

In its entirety the clause stated:
Subcontractor hereby
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the federal courts of the
Southern District of Florida for the resolution of any and all
disputes involving an aggregate amount of $10,000.00 or more and
agrees that service by registered mail to its address set forth
above shall constitute sufficient service. Id.
3

The entire clause stated: The place of a?I payments required
under this agreement and the venue of actions for disputed matters
and performances are placed in the City of Oakland, county of
Alameda, State of California. Id.
16

strong language and clear illustration, the contractual stipulation
cannot be characterized as permissive only.
Because the defendant has not waived its right to assert the
contractual provision, the plaintiff is bound to its agreement.

III. THE EQUITIES ARE EQUALLY DIVIDED BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFFS AND
THE DEFENDANTS RESIDENCE AS VENUE CHOICES.
"The burden should be upon the party who brings suit elsewhere
than in the selected state to persuade the court that enforcement
of the choice of forum clause would be unjust."

Colonial Leasing

Co. v. Mcllroy. 765 P.2d at 220. In Colonial the court found that
"the jurisdictional provision was not a 'take-it-or-leave-it'
proposition. . . . The Defendant chose to take it, and plaintiff
did not compel that choice."

Id.

Accordingly, the court ruled

that enforcement of the clause was not unfair or unreasonable.
When the equities are equally balanced, the forum selection
clause should be enforced.

Cedarbrook Associates v. Equitec

Savings Bank. 678 F. Supp. 107, 108 (E.D. Pa. 1987). In Cedarbrook
the

plaintiffs'

documents

and

witnesses

were

located

in

Pennsylvania while the defendant's documents and an important
witness were located in California.

The forum selection clause

specified venue should lie in California. The court held the trial
should be in California because "as between the two forums, one
side is bound to be inconvenienced."

Id.

In Rini Wine Co. . the court stated: "it should be incumbent on
the party seeking to escape his contract to show that trial in the
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient
17

that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in
court."

604 F. Supp. at 1059.

The court further noted that

"litigation to one degree or another subjects all parties, whether
corporations or individual, to hardship. The essential inquiry is
whether plaintiff could foresee these inconveniences at the time of
entering into the agreement."

Id. Having so noted, the Rini Wine

Co. court held that because the inconveniences were foreseeable the
plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proof. Id. ; see, also, LFC
Lessors, Inc.. 585 F. Supp. at 1364-1395 (Where businessman was not
coerced into signing the agreement and enforcement of the clause
would not effectively deprive him of his day in court, agreement
would be enforced);

Karlbera European Tanspa Inc., v. JK-Josef

Dratz Vertriebsaesellschaft MBH. 615 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. 111. 1986)
(American distributor required to litigate in West Germany because
inconveniences not insurmountable and therefore plaintiff was not
deprived of his day in court).
The instant case is not simply a failure by the defendant to
pay for goods received pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code
Article Two Sales Contract case.

Defendant intends to assert

numerous affirmative defenses and counterclaims in its response.
(Record at 40, 41).

Although plaintiff may be inconvenienced by

litigating in the state of California, defendant will be equally
inconvenienced if it is forced to litigate in the state of Utah.
The parties have already agreed and stipulated who should bare the
burden of these inconveriences. Plaintiff should not be allowed to
escape the terms of the bargained for Agreement.
18

IV,

THE UNDERLYING CONTRACT GOVERNS THE CURRENT ACTION, EVEN IF IT
WERE FOUND TO HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVELY TERMINATED BY THE WRONGFUL
UNILATERAL ACTIONS OF THE PLAINTIFF,
11

In

the

implicitly

absence

indicating

of
the

contractual
contrary,

survives termination of the contract.

language

a

forum

expressly

selection

or

clause

Termination of a contract

does not divest parties of rights and duties already accrued,"
Advent Electronics, Inc. v. Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., 709 F.
Supp. 843, 846 (N.D. 111. 1989).

Further, if resolution of given

claims relates to the interpretation of a contract containing a
forum selection clause, the forum selection clause will govern,
even though the claims may sound in tort.

Id.

Finally, even if

the contract is invalid because of fraud, "the fraud complained of
must

be

specifically

related

to

the

inclusion

selection clause" in order to invalidate it.

of

the

forum

Zions First National

Bank v. Allen. 688 F. Supp. 1495, 1498 (D. Ut. 1988).
In February

of 1991, the plaintiff, unilaterally

and

in

violation of the express terms of the contract, attempted to
terminate the contract.

(Record at 40) .

Defendant has never

recognized plaintiff's improper termination and intends to assert
numerous defenses and counterclaims based upon plaintiff's wrongful
actions.

However, even if the court finds that the Agreement was

validly terminated, under the above stated principles, the forum
selection clause should still be enforced because the action arose
out of the Agreement or was in connection with the transactions
contemplated thereir.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the final order of the
district court should be affirmed.
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